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As Syria enters its ninth year of civil war, the numbers only 
continue to rise. Deaths have reached 370,000 and counting.1 More 
than 6.2 million individuals have been internally displaced. Over 5.6 
million individuals have registered as refugees. Loss in cumulative 
GDP has topped 226 billion dollars.2 But as the numbers remain 
staggeringly high, dominating international attention, there has been a 
shift in the power balance of the war—a shift back towards the 
previous status quo with the Assad regime holding a firm clasp on 
territorial power.3 And with the announcement from President Trump 
to withdraw U.S. troops from Syria, the Assad regime watches one 
more player trickle off the battlefield as they close in on the last 
remaining rebel enclave in Idlib.4 An end, thus, looms in sight with 
President Assad in power and the regime still standing. While the 
precise date of this end remains precarious, it is critical to begin 
examining the options available to Syria post armed conflict to 
transition the country away from violence, and any cycles of violence, 
into sustainable peace. 
The most widely recognized, highly funded paradigm of 
transitional justice is retributive justice, taking on the form of 
                                               
 1 Eight years after the war began, more than 370,000 individuals have been killed, 
including 112,000 civilians., FRANCE24 (Mar. 15, 2019), 
https://www.france24.com/en/20190315-syria-death-toll-tops-370000-8-years-
war-monitor. 
 2 The World Bank In Syrian Arab Republic, Overview, THE WORLD BANK (Oct. 
11, 2018), www.worldbank.org/en/country/syria/overview. 
 3 See Liz Sly, Syria’s War Could Be Entering Its Last and Most Dangerous Phase, 
THE WASH. POST, (Aug. 10, 2018,), www.washingtonpost.com/world/syrias-war-
could-be-entering-its-last-and-most-dangerous-phase/2018/08/09/e9e60442-8f60-
11e8-ae59-01880eac5f1d_story.html?utm_term=.0bc52680dba0. 
 4 See Missy Ryan and Josh Dawsey, U.S. Troops to Be Pulled out of Syria Quickly, 
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international criminal tribunals (“ICTs”). Following World War II and 
the infamous Nuremberg Trials, contemporary schemes of justice have 
been molded into ICTs as vehicles to settle disputes and to try the most 
serious of human rights violations.5 Impunity was the target; 
international jurisprudence was the tool. But as ICTs have increased in 
frequency consecutively with on-going human rights abuses, the 
discourse on the efficacy of such retributive mechanisms has grown.6 
Concerns center on whether the goals of justice have been achieved, 
whether international showcases of punishment effectively deter 
future abuses, and whether the high costs of such institutions are offset 
by the benefits gained. With Syria’s civil war approaching a new phase 
of its life, finding the answers to these concerns re-emerges as a goal 
more critical than ever to accomplish. 
Through a brief examination of the history of ICTs, we 
attempt to address these concerns and apply them to Syria. First, we 
look at what types of issues an international tribunal would be handling 
by examining what types of crimes have been perpetrated in Syria. 
Next, we evaluate whether international criminal prosecution exists as 
an available option in Syria’s near future. Then we examine, if 
prosecution does present itself plausible, what the cost-benefit scale 
would look like for a Syrian tribunal based on past and present ICTs. 
Looking at a variety of factors from cost to legitimacy to political 
challenges, this holistic lens drives us to a conclusion that not only is 
international criminal prosecution an improbable option in Syria’s near 
future, but that even if it were plausible, the benefits reaped would 
serve neither local Syrian interests nor international goals. Last, we 
offer a different picture of Syria’s future, shaped by reconstruction, 
reparations, and reconciliation rather than retribution to pave the way 
for a balance of peace with accountability. 
                                               
 5 See Ad Hoc Tribunals International, INT’L COMMITTEE of the RED CROSS 1 
(Feb. 9, 2017,), www.icrc.org/en/document/ad-hoc-tribunals. 
 6 See generally Julian Ku and Jide Nzelibe, Do international criminal tribunals deter 
or exacerbate humanitarian atrocities?, 84 WASH. ULU. L. REV. 779 (2006); See also David 
Wippman, The Costs of International Justice, 100 INT’L L. 861 (2006).; See also Mirjan 
Damaska, What is the point of international criminal justice?, 83 CHI.-.–KENT L. REV. 329 
(2008). 
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II. THE CRIMES 
Assessing the plausibility of a war crimes tribunal necessitates 
understanding the extent to which the court is to prosecute individual 
crimes. Given the scale, the extremity, and the arduous disposition of 
such a war, understanding the crimes committed by all parties to the 
war proves to be a daunting, if not quite near insurmountable task. The 
mere quantity of armed groups involved on the ground in Syria 
complicates such a task, with each major party to the war, the Baathist 
Party, rebel forces, Russia, Iran, Turkey, the Kurds, and ISIL being 
partitioned into smaller bands each responsible for asserting their own 
agendas.7 Moreover, the war is still ongoing and first hand access to 
the country to investigate alleged crimes remains near impossible. This 
has left the global community without fundamental resources to fully 
comprehend to what extent crimes are taking place and, more 
importantly, by whom. While the issue of evidence procurement and 
reliability will be addressed later, it is critical to discern what types of 
crimes a potential court would be facing if such an avenue for 
transitional justice is to be pursued. 
Two different mechanisms, both spawned by the United 
Nations, have been established as an effort to document and preserve 
evidence of international law violations and crimes within Syria. First 
in 2011, the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the 
Syrian Arab Republic (“the Commission”) was established by the UN 
Human Rights Council “to investigate all alleged violations of 
international human rights law since March 2011 in the Syrian Arab 
Republic, to establish the facts and circumstances that may amount to 
such violations . . . and, where possible, to identify those responsible.”8 
In 2016, the UN General Assembly went even further by establishing 
the International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism (“IIIM”), 
with the specific mandate to “to collect, consolidate, preserve and 
analyze evidence of violations of international humanitarian law and 
                                               
 7 Alia Chunghtai, Syria’s War: Who Controls What?, GCC News, AL JAZEERA, 
Al Jazeera, (Mar. 13, 2019, 15:09 GMT), 
www.aljazeera.com/indepth/interactive/2015/05/syria-country-divided-
150529144229467.html. 
 8 Report Rep. of the Human Rights Hum. Rts. Council on its 17th special 
session, ¶ 13, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/S–17/2 (2011).  
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human rights violations and abuses and to prepare files in order to 
facilitate and expedite . . . criminal proceedings.”9 The main difference 
between the two mechanisms is that the Commission focuses on 
investigating and publishing records of crimes, while the IIIM focuses 
on collecting and preserving evidence of international law violations 
and individual criminal liability for use in future prosecutions. 
Furthermore, the IIIM is not required to publicly disclose the evidence 
collected nor publish reports on its findings, highlighting its particular 
attention to evidence preservation.10 Given the restricted status of 
IIIM findings, reports by the Commission will be employed to paint a 
better picture for the class of crimes and evidence that a future tribunal 
would be evaluating. 
A. Unlawful Killing 
Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions prohibits the killing of 
persons taking no part in the hostilities outside of a judgement by a 
regularly constituted court and the due process of law.11 Under the 
Rome Statute, murder of civilians is a crime against humanity under 
Article 7 (1)(a), willful killing is a war crime under Article 8(2)(a)(i), 
intentionally attacking civilians is a war crime under Article 8(2)(b)(i), 
and killing or wounding an hors de combat fighter is a war crime under 
Article 8(2)(b)(vi).12 The right to life is further protected under a 
number of international treaties, including the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (“ICCPR”).13 
Since the start of the war in 2011, there has been documented 
evidence corroborated by eyewitnesses that implicates government 
forces in the extrajudicial killings of civilians and hors de combats in 
                                               
 9 General Assembly G. A. Res.71/248, ¶ 4. (Dec. 21, 2016). 
 10 Theodor Meron, Closing the Accountability Gap: Concrete Steps Toward Ending 
Impunity for Atrocity Crimes, 112.3 AM. J. INT’L L. 433, 443 (2018). 
 11 The Geneva Conventions common art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 63 U.S.T. 3114, 
3217, 3316, 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 31, 85, 135, 287 [hereinafter Geneva Conventions.]. 
 12 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court common art. 7–8, July 
17, 1998, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.183/9 (1998), 37 I.L.M. 999 [hereinafter Rome Statute].  
 13 See G. A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights. art. 3 
(Dec. 10, 1948); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights part III, art. 6, 
Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR.]. 
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violation of Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions.14 Starting in 2011, 
eyewitnesses, including defectors, alleged government forces using 
indiscriminate attacks to systematically quell protestors.15 In 2016, 
reports were made of detainees perishing while in government custody, 
often times following arbitrary detention.16 Furthermore, a 2016 UN 
report asserts that the systematic deaths of prisoners in regime-
controlled detention centers constitutes crimes against humanity.17 A 
2018 report documents pro-government militia members 
indiscriminately attacking civilians and a site for internally displaced 
people in northern Homs. The victims included both children and the 
elderly.18 
Akin to the regime forces, reports have documented extra 
judicial killings by non- government forces including both foreign and 
domestic armed factions. A 2013 report documented, “a captured 
soldier or pro-government fighter who ‘confesses’ faces immediate 
execution. . . . On 20 May, a captured soldier was executed in Qalat Al-
Madiq after confessing to killing a fighter for the Free Syrian Army 
(“FSA”).”19 Furthermore, eyewitnesses have reported anti-government 
forces killing civilians and hors de combat fighters.20 In one instance, anti-
government fighters executed pro-government Sunnis in villages 
outside Dara’a city.21 In 2017, armed non-government forces carried 
out numerous car explosions in Al-Rashidin, including one instance 
which alone killed ninety-six evacuees, of which sixty-eight were 
                                               
 14 See generally Independent International Commission Indep. Int’l Comm’n 
of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, Reports 2011-2018. 
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/IICISyria/Pages/Documentation.a
spx. 
 15 UN Human Rights U.N. Hum. Rts. Council, Report of the independent 
international commission Indep. International Comm’n of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab 
Republic, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/S–17/2/Add.1, ¶ 41(2011) [hereinafter: The 
Commission.]. 
 16 The Commission, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/33/55., ¶ 11 (2016). 
 17 UN Human U.N. Hum. Rts. Council, Out of Sight, Out of Mind: Deaths in 
Detention in the Syrian Arab Republic, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/31/CRP.1; hereinafter ¶ 97 
(Feb. 3, 2016) [hereinafter Out of Sight, Out of Mind.]. 
 18 The Commission, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/39/65., ¶ 32–5 (2018).  
 19 The Commission, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/24/46., ¶ 49 (2013). 
 20 The Commission, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/22/59., ¶ 64 (2013). 
 21 Id. ¶ 62. 
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children. 22 That same year, residents of Aqarib al-Safiyah fell victim to 
ISIL-lead snipers during the night. The Commission reported that 
“among the victims were a four-month-old baby and an eleven-year-
old boy. In total, fifty-two civilians were killed, including seven women 
and twelve children.”23 In 2013, Jabhat Al-Nusra, an Al Qaeda affiliate, 
was found to command several makeshift courts, whose procedures 
resulted in summary execution without due process.24 One video 
shows Jabhat Al-Nusra fighters executing twelve pro-government 
soldiers with gunshots to their heads.25 
B. Arbitrary Arrests and Detention  
Article 9 of the ICCPR forbids arbitrary arrest or detention: 
“Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall 
be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention.”26 Persons who are 
arrested are to be told of the reasons for their arrest pursuant to 
established law.27 If a person is arrested on a criminal charge, they are 
to be brought before a judge or authorized official who is empowered 
by law to exercise judicial authority. 28 Furthermore, Article 55 (1)(c) 
of the Rome Statute prohibits arbitrary arrest or detention.29 
In 2013, the Commission interviewed approximately fifty 
interviewees who reported arbitrary arrest by both government and 
anti-government forces.30 Most of those arrested were male, some of 
these arrestees were even children.31 Reports indicate that during 
government led raids in neighborhoods, those suspected of partaking 
in opposition or rebel activities were sent to one of the varying 
government-controlled detention centers. There, the prisoners were 
often tortured to procure information that would expose others 
                                               
 22 The Commission, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/36/55., ¶ 40 (2017). 
 23 Id. ¶ 45. 
 24 See Out of Sight, Out of Mind, supra note 17, ¶ 71. 
 25 Id. ¶ 72. 
 26 ICCPR, supra note 13, at art. 9. 
 27 Id. 
 28 Id.  
 29 Rome Statute, supra note 12, at art. 55. 
 30 The Commission, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/22/59, supra note 20 at Annex VI. 
, ¶ 1. 
 31 Id. ¶ 2. 
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possibly involved in oppositional activities to create a list of future 
arrestees.32 Those arrested were held indefinitely without access to legal 
counsel. Often, those detained were only released in exchange for 
ransom or bribes.33 In one instance, a man from Dara’a was detained 
for six months before being released following a payment of 300,000 
Lira (3,000 USD) to government officials.34 A 2016 Commission report 
titled, “Out of Sight, Out of Mind: Deaths in Detention in the Syrian 
Arab Republic,” estimates that tens of thousands of people have been 
detained by the Syrian government, while thousands have disappeared 
after initial arrest by state forces or while moving through government 
held territory.35 Most of the deaths taking place in detention centers 
were reported to be in detentions centers controlled by regime 
intelligence services, the mukhabarat.36 Furthermore, the extent to 
which these enforced disappearances have been taking place by 
government forces has been characterized by the Commission as “a 
widespread and systemic attack against the civilian population.”37 
Similarly, early scenes of the civil war saw anti-government 
armed groups taking members of the regime’s coalition hostage. Some 
were taken for ransom or exchange; others were taken for intelligence 
and recruitment purposes.38 One witness explained, “After the army 
has come and gone, the FSA come back and do the same. They also 
arrest and detain people. . . . We don’t know what happened to them. 
They’d take them away and we’d never see them again.”39 Anti-
government groups often created their own makeshift detention 
centers, where detainees, including both civilians and government 
soldiers, were held, tortured, and killed, some by means of execution 
and others by means of lack of medication and extensive injury.40 It is 
critical to note that the dynamic and inconsistent nature of these anti-
                                               
 32 Id. ¶ 5. 
 33 Id. ¶ 7. 
 34 Id. ¶ 12. 
 35 Out of Sight, Out of Mind, supra note 17, ¶ 4. 
 36 Id. ¶ 36. 
 37 Id. ¶ 19.  
 38 The Commission, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/22/59, supra note 20, at Annex VI, 
¶ 15–9. 
 39 Id. ¶ 17. 
 40 Out of Sight, Out of Mind, supra note 17, ¶ 67 –9. 
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government armed forces, including dissolution, reformation, and 
evolution of new groups, has limited the Commission’s ability to track 
the violations by these groups. 41 
C. Torture and Ill-Treatment 
Torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment are 
prohibited under Article 7 of the ICCPR.42 Additionally, the UN 
General Assembly ratified the Convention Against Torture and Other 
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment in 1984, to 
which Syria is a signatory.43 It should be noted, however, that under 
this convention only public officials or persons acting in official 
capacity are encompassed within the definition of torture; thus, torture 
by anti-government forces or non-state actors would be excluded from 
this scope of liability. Common Article 3(1)(a) of the Geneva 
Conventions forbids “violence to life and persons, in particular . . . 
cruel treatment and torture.”44 The Rome Stature categorizes torture 
or inhuman treatment as a crime against humanity under Article 7(1)(a) 
and a war crime under Article 8(2)(a)(ii).45 
The Commission conducted interviews in 2012 with 
individuals who had either been tortured at a detention center or 
endured torture at an unofficial facility by government officials and 
officers.46 Torture was consistently described among the interviewees 
who discussed “being severely beaten about the head and body with 
electric cables, whips, metal and wooden sticks and rifle butts, burned 
with cigarettes, kicked, or subjected to electric shocks applied to 
sensitive parts of the body, including the genitals.”47 Some other 
torture tactics included hanging detainees to walls or ceilings by their 
wrists, tying detainees to boards while they were either stretched or 
                                               
 41 Id. ¶ 66. 
 42 ICCPR, supra note 13, ¶7. 
 43 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984 
1465 U.N.T.S. 85. 
 44 Geneva Conventions, supra note 11, at art. 3.  
 45 Rome Statute, supra note 12, at art. 7. 
 46 The Commission, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/21/50., ¶ 74–7 (2012). 
 47 Id. ¶ 77. 
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folded in half, and engaging in sexual violence.48 Degrading treatment 
has included forcibly shaving the detainees, forcing detainees to imitate 
animals, forcibly undressing detainees who would remain nude for an 
extended periods of time, and threatening both assault and execution 
on the detainees themselves as well as their relatives.49 Detainees 
reported lack of food, water, medication, and sanitary facilities at 
detention centers.50 One detainee reported drinking his own urine after 
going a week without water.51 Another report documents that a 
fourteen-year-old boy detained following demonstrations received 
electric shocks and beatings during an interrogation by Military 
Intelligence.52 
Starting in 2012, the Commission documented reports of 
torture and ill-treatment, including infliction of severe pain, 
punishment and humiliation by armed groups against members of 
government forces.53 Captured government fighters reported that they 
were beaten with electric wire and had their heads forcibly pushed in 
and out of water in a threat of drowning.54 Video footages depicts 
Syrian security forces and regime supporters confessing under torture; 
the detainees displayed signs of physical abuse including bruising, 
bleeding, and broken bones.55 Civilians suspected of government 
affiliation have been subjected to torture by anti-government armed 
groups; some have died because of the extent of their injuries.56 In 
August of 2013, armed groups detained and tortured civilians for their 
religion; in July of 2013, Kurds were beaten and electrocuted by 
Islamist terrorist factions.57 At checkpoints in Ar Raqqah and Al-
Hasakah, armed groups (including Jabhat-al-Nusra, Ahrar Al-Sham, 
Shahic Walid Al-Sukhni Battalion) would routinely beat, humiliate, and 
expose civilians to harsh treatment, including severe physical and 
                                               
 48 Id. ¶ 78. 
 49 Id. ¶ 79. 
 50 Id. ¶ 81. 
 51 Id. 
 52 Id. at Annex VIII, ¶ 12. 
 53 Id. ¶ 32.  
 54 Id. ¶ 30. 
 55 Id. ¶ 31. 
 56 Out of Sight, Out of Mind, supra note 17, ¶ 68. 
 57 The Commission, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/25/65., ¶ 58 (2014). 
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mental suffering.58 The Commission determined that the level of 
torture and inhuman treatment by nonstate armed groups constitutes 
widespread and systematic attack on the civilian population.59 
D. Rape and Sexual Violence 
Rape and sexual violence are defined as crimes against 
humanity under Article 7(1)(g) and war crimes under Article 
8(2)(b)(xxii) of the Rome Statute.60 The Geneva Conventions do not 
list rape and sexual violence as prohibited acts; however, under 
common Article 3, violence to life and person, cruel treatment, torture, 
and outrages upon personal dignity are all prohibited.61 Additionally, 
Article 8(2)(e)(vi) of the Rome Statute lists rape, sexual slavery, and any 
other form of sexual violence as violations of common Article 3 to the 
Geneva Conventions.62 Additional Protocol II to the Geneva 
Conventions and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-
International Armed Conflicts adds rape, enforced prostitution, and 
any indecent assault to the list of prohibited acts against civilians.63 
Furthermore, the realm of liability for rape and sexual violence has 
increasingly expanded through ad hoc tribunals, including the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”) 
and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (“ICTR”). The 
ICTY and ICTR have both proscribed acts of sexual violence among 
indictments for genocide, torture, inhumane acts, and crimes against 
humanity.64 
                                               
 58 Id. ¶ 58–9. 
 59 Id. ¶ 60. 
 60 Rome Statute, supra note 12, at arts. 7–8. 
 61 Geneva Conventions, supra note 11, at art. 3. 
 62 Rome Statute, supra note 12, at art. 8.  
 63 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and 
relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts 
(Protocol II) art. 4(2), June 8, 1977., 1125 U.N.T.S. 3. 
 64 See, e.g., Crimes of Sexual Violence: Landmark Cases.” United Nations: 
International, U. N.: INT’L CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, 
https://www.icty.org/en/features/crimes-sexual-violence/landmark-cases.; 
Prosecutor v. Akayesu, ICTR-96-4-T;, Judgment (June 1, 2001); Prosecutor v. 
Ferdinand Nahimana, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza, and Hassan Ngeze, ICTR-99-52-T, 
Judgement (Dec. 3, 2003.). 
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Collecting evidence for rape and sexual violence has proven to 
be one of the hardest tasks in the pursuit of the truth. Cultural, social, 
and religious institutions surrounding sexuality within Syria have 
created roadblocks in procuring eyewitness and victim testimonies of 
the extent to which these crimes have taken place.65 Nonetheless, 
evidence of rape and sexual violence does exist, though it may 
underestimate the frequency to which these crimes take place. 
Reports demonstrate that government forces overwhelmingly 
used rape and sexual violence during house searches, at checkpoints, 
and in both official and unofficial detention centers.66 Government 
forces and Shabiha, pro-government militias, used house raids to arrest 
males suspected of partaking in opposition activities; there, women 
were subjected to rapes and often gang-rapes by up to six perpetrators 
while their families, husbands, and children were forced to watch.67 In 
2012, reports indicate that women were also abducted, raped, and 
forced to walk naked in the streets of Homs.68 Accounts further 
demonstrate that rape and sexual violence were used as part of torture 
and coercive tactics in detention centers as a means to procure 
information and force surrender.69 Numerous accounts depict males 
receiving electric shocks and burning by cigarettes or lighters to their 
genitals, genital mutilation, and rape using objects including batons, 
wooden sticks, pipes, and bottles.70 Children as young as nine years old 
also fell victim to rape and sexual violence.71 The Commission 
determined that Government forces used rape and sexual violence as 
part of a widespread and systematic attack against civilians.72 
The infrequent use of checkpoints by armed groups and the 
decreased movement of persons from Government territory into 
territory controlled by armed groups reduced the exposure of women 
                                               
 65 The Commission., U.N. Doc. A/HRC/21/50, supra note 454, ¶ 97. 
 66 Id. ¶ 98. 
 67 UN Human Rights U.N. Hum. Rts. Council, “I lost my dignity”: Sexual and 
gender-based violence in the Syrian Arab Republic, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/37/CRP.3. ¶ 14, 
49–50 (Mar. 8, 2018) [hereinafter Sexual and gender-based violence in Syria.].  
 68 The Commission, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/21/50, supra note 45, ¶ 98. 
 69 Sexual and gender-based violence in Syria, supra note 67, ¶ 43. 
 70 Id. ¶ 44–50. 
 71 Id. ¶ 14. 
 72 Id. at Summary. 
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from pro-government areas to rape and sexual violence.73 Contrary to 
the findings regarding government forces, the Commission 
determined that evidence does not exist, of the use of rape and sexual 
violence by armed groups as a part of a systematic and widespread 
practice to extract information, extract loyalty, and cause fear.74 Rather, 
rape and sexual violence most often were used by non-government 
forces in instances of exploitation, sectarianism, and revenge.75 For 
instance in 2013, a family, suspected of being Shi’a, was travelling to 
Damascus when they were stopped and subsequently raped by an 
unknown opposition group.76 In another instance, a young Sunni girl 
befriended government soldiers to ease her passage through a 
checkpoint. The relationship between the girl and the soldiers was not 
sexual; but the girl’s Facebook page depicted the Government of Syria 
flag.77 The girl was consequently raped by FSA members for her alleged 
support of the government.78 Armed groups also have used threats of 
rape and sexual violence to pressure families into allowing their young 
daughters to marry FSA fighters.79 
The Commission found evidence of severe psychological, 
mental, and social impacts by the use of rape and sexual violence. 
Depression is prominent among the affected individuals while 
adequate mental health facilities remain sparse.80 Furthermore, 
established views of sexuality and marriage have created an 
environment where interviewees described rape as worse than death.81 
Men and boys subjected to rape and sexual violence described 
overwhelming shame, impotency, and guilt.82 Some women were 
impregnated by rape. With the illegality of seeking abortion under 
domestic law, women and girls face a range of dangerous situations: 
either seek illegal or outsourced procedures for abortion or have the 
                                               
 73 Id. ¶ 51. 
 74 Id. ¶ 52. 
 75 Id. 
 76 Id. ¶ 53. 
 77 Id. ¶ 54.  
 78 Id. 
 79 Id. ¶ 55. 
 80 Id. ¶ 94. 
 81 Id. ¶ 95. 
 82 Id. ¶ 96. 
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child and face the societal and religious implications of having a child 
of rape.83 Children who witnessed such sexual violence suffer 
psychological and physical consequences including nightmares, bed-
wetting, shaking, inability to speak of the events, and trauma.84 
III. PROSECUTORIAL AVENUES 
Three arenas exist to pursue criminal prosecution of the 
international law violations committed during the Syrian Civil War: (1) 
ad hoc tribunals, including international and hybrid tribunals, (2) the 
International Criminal Court (“ICC”), and (3) domestic courts. While 
each arena presents its own challenges, both of the international 
routes, ad hoc tribunals and the ICC, have been institutionally 
constructed in a manner that would make establishing jurisdiction over 
Syria nearly impossible. Ad hoc tribunals are at the mercy of the United 
Nations Security Council for authority to pursue prosecution. The 
ICC, absent state party membership or state consent, is likewise reliant 
on the Security Council for a grant of authority to exercise jurisdiction. 
But in contrast to the previous two avenues, domestic courts are 
exclusively independent of international authority and require no 
further efforts to establish jurisdiction over the crimes committed in 
Syria; rather, domestic courts present more internal issues concerning 
the legitimacy and integrity of such existing institutions to deliver 
justice. Considering each available prosecutorial channel will highlight 
the improbable reality of each one propositioning itself as feasible 
mechanism for justice. 
A. Ad Hoc Tribunals 
The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 
(“ICTY”), established in 1993, rejuvenated the modern global 
inclination toward ad hoc tribunals as the archetype for trying 
individuals.85 Global governance saw court after court established, all 
created with individualized mandates, from the civil war in Sierra 
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Leone to the genocide in Rwanda. As the frequency of these courts 
grew, two categories of criminal courts emerged: (1) international 
criminal courts, and (2) hybrid criminal courts. 
International criminal courts, like the ICTY, export domestic 
violations of international humanitarian law and human rights law to a 
court comprised of international judges, attorneys, and law.86 Hybrid 
tribunals, the more fledgling forum, fuse components of international 
prosecution with components of the local judiciary in an effort to bring 
prosecution closer to the population and victims of impact.87 
Irrespective of the variations in staff and law utilized by the two 
categories, the ad hoc and international nature of these courts imply a 
reliance on the United Nations as an organ to create and largely fund 
the appropriate vehicle to carry out these prosecutions. All past ad hoc 
tribunals, with the exception of the Extraordinary Chambers in the 
Courts of Cambodia (“ECCC”), which was established by a joint 
agreement between the UN and the Cambodian government, have 
been procured from a UN Security Council resolution, detailing the 
individualized mandates of these mechanisms.88 
Chapter VII of the UN charter for the Security Council has 
evolved in its authority to create these prosecutorial mechanisms. 
Article 39 of Chapter VII espouses the Security Council to “determine 
the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of 
aggression and . . . make recommendations, or decide what measures 
shall be taken . . . to maintain or restore international peace and 
security.”89 Considering the broad nature of Article 39, interpretations 
have since effectuated international mechanisms like the ICTY and 
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hybrid mechanisms like the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (“STL”).90 
But a critical component of the Security Council’s authority to 
determine how and if such measures should be taken is the institutional 
design of the Security Council, specifically the five permanent 
members on the council. 
Chapter V of the UN Charter dictates that China, France, 
Russia, the United States, and the United Kingdom individually bear 
the right to veto any resolution passing through the Security Council.91 
A reflection of post-World War II global order, any of the five 
permanent members can effectively halt efforts by the council to 
address threats and breaches of peace. Thus, all UN Security Council 
resolutions are exclusively dependent on concurring approval by these 
five countries. Five countries, out of a global world order consisting of 
195 countries, control the existence and fate of international criminal 
courts. Herein lies the first challenge ahead in pursuing individual 
accountability for war crimes within Syria, specifically crimes by the 
incumbent Assad regime. 
Russia, wielding one of the five vetoes on the council, has 
persisted as a staunch proponent of the Assad regime for the entirety 
of the war, ensuring the Kremlin maintains the whole of its 
geostrategic interests.92 Syria presents itself as an attractive contender 
geographically, economically, and politically for Russia to root its stake 
in the Middle East, an analogous counterpart to the U.S. foothold in 
Saudi Arabia.93 The downfall of the Alawite Assad regime would 
reorient regional dynamics, ushering in the already looming Sunni- 
dominated order with Saudi Arabia and the United States at the head 
of the table.94 With a Russian port in Tartus, the Kremlin holds a 
critical passageway to the Mediterranean for economic and military 
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use.95 Combine all these interests together and the result is consistent 
opposition to any UN led intervention in Syria and absolute rejection 
of any attempt to proceed with action under Chapter VII of the UN 
charter.96 
Consequently, if the Assad regime is to stay in power and 
Russia is to continue shielding the regime from the rest of the global 
community, there will not be a UN resolution any time soon 
authorizing the prosecution of any humanitarian law and human rights 
violations that the regime may be guilty of. The closest thing we may 
see to a viable attempt at retributive justice would be trying the crimes 
committed by the regime’s armed opponents, which the UN has 
documented evidence for.97 While holding these armed groups 
accountable for violating international law is salient, the overwhelming 
amount of international calls for justice are directed towards the crimes 
of the Assad regime. Any prosecutions that exclude the high-ranking 
officials within the regime would only rejuvenate the argument for 
victor’s justice and potentially exacerbate sectarian tensions. 
B. The International Criminal Court 
The alternative international prosecutorial path would be 
proceeding through the International Criminal Court (“ICC”), 
established in 1998 as the first permanent international court. With the 
intent to try individuals rather than states, the Court prosecutes four 
main crimes: genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and 
crimes of aggression.98 Thus, pursuing individual criminal liability for 
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high-ranking officials within the regime would seem to be the next 
logical option for Syrian transitional justice, given that the crimes of 
the regime fall appropriately within the scope of the Court. However, 
akin to the obstacles encountered when pursuing prosecution through 
ad hoc tribunal, establishing appropriate ICC jurisdiction over the 
Assad regime presents itself improbable and implausible. 
The ICC has three means by which it can exercise jurisdiction 
over a particular crime. First, Article 13(a) of the Rome Statute allows 
the ICC to exercise jurisdiction through State Party referral.99 A state 
that has signed and ratified the Rome Statute can refer alleged crimes 
to the ICC prosecutor if they occurred on the territory of the State 
Party or another State Party, or if the alleged crimes were committed 
by a national from a State Party.100 Syria, though it signed the Rome 
Statute, has yet to ratify it, and therefore, is not a member state to the 
ICC. Consequently, to proceed down this path, the Syrian government 
would need to ratify the Rome Statute. Given the domestic 
circumstances for the incumbent regime and the turmoil embroiled by 
the civil war, ratification of the Rome Statute would be a far from 
pragmatic option. 
Second, Article 13(b) of the Rome Statute empowers the UN 
Security Council to refer states to the ICC under Chapter VII of the 
UN Charter, irrespective of whether the referred state is a Rome 
Statute signatory.101 As previously discussed when examining the 
viability of a UN Security Council resolution to establish an Ad Hoc 
tribunal, a web of geostrategic interests are so strongly weaved between 
the Assad regime and Russia that any chances of a referral will be 
halted at their inception. That is not to say an attempt hasn’t been 
made—it has. In May of 2014, the Security Council voted on a 
resolution to refer Syria to the ICC for investigation.102 Russia acted in 
accordance with its geopolitical interests and vetoed the resolution. 
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Moreover, China also exercised its veto power, in line with its stringent 
opposition to any western imperialist practices that may usher in 
regime change.103 Thus, two of five different players on the Security 
Council maintain political coalitional restraints that, in turn, restrain 
the Security Council from proceeding with any accountability measures 
that could perturb the Assad regime and the current state of the nation. 
The third jurisdictional trigger available to the ICC is a proprio 
motu investigation under Article 15 of the Rome Statute.104 The ICC 
prosecutor may choose to investigate alleged crimes that either 
occurred on the territory, or by a national, of a State Party; or on the 
territory, or by a national, of a non-State Party that has consented to 
ICC jurisdiction. Again, akin to the challenges discussed previously, 
consent to any ICC jurisdiction lies outside the incumbent regime’s 
interests. The Assad regime is already facing a fragile legitimization of 
their state power domestically. Any consent to foreign prosecution, 
even if it were to only target a specific few high-ranking officials, would 
not only shake their already teetering grasp on power, but would cast 
open a wider vacuum for competing factions to take hold. 
While these three avenues have historically been the only 
options available to establish jurisdiction, the ICC recently unlocked a 
fourth channel through which jurisdiction could be established. In 
September of 2018, the ICC published a decision that would allow 
prosecutors to pursue charges against officials of Myanmar, a state that 
is not party to the ICC, has not been referred to the ICC by the UN 
Security Council, nor has consented to ICC jurisdiction. The charges 
were instead pursued by means of jurisdiction over neighboring 
Bangladesh, which is a state party to the ICC.105 To be specific, the 
prosecutors submitted a request to pursue charges of deportation and 
forcible transfer of the Rohingya population from Myanmar to 
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Bangladesh under Article 7(1)(d) of the Rome Statute.106 The Court 
affirmed in its ruling that, while the Assembly of States of the United 
Nations brought into existence the ICC, the judicial entity exists 
independently and has continued in its existence with both 
cooperation by State parties and non-State parties to prosecute the 
most serious international crimes.107 Furthermore, it justified that the 
exercise of jurisdiction is valid in that Article 12(2)(a) of the Rome 
Statute dictates that the Court has jurisdiction if the conduct in 
question occurred on the territory of a state party.108 Herein the Court 
decided that these preconditions set out by Article 12 are minimum 
standards which are fulfilled if at least one element of the crime 
satisfies it.109 The conduct in question, being deportation and forcible 
transfer of populations, in part took place on the territory of 
Bangladesh, a state party, where the Rohingya populations settled as a 
result of the deportations by Myanmar.110 As such, at least one element 
of the crime meets the Article 12 criteria; thus, the entirety of the crime 
was ruled as falling within ICC jurisdiction. The Court concluded, “the 
Chamber is of the view that acts of deportation initiated in a State not 
Party to the Statute (through expulsion or other coercive acts) and 
completed in a State Party to the Statute (by virtue of victims crossing 
the border to a State) fall within the parameters of article 12(2)(a) of 
the Statute.”111 
This 2018 decision has consequently created a precedent that 
is now being used by attorneys to pursue charges against the Assad 
regime. Lawyers have requested the ICC to investigate alleged crimes 
by the Assad regime, using the September 2018 precedent.112 In this 
case, refugees have fled to Jordan, a state party to the ICC, following 
torture, abuse, violence, and widespread and systematic violations.113 
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Applying the same ruling from 2018 to this situation, prosecutors 
could seek charges of individual criminal liability for crimes against 
humanity, specifically deportation and other broader crimes that meet 
Article 12(2)(a) for jurisdiction. At this point in time, the Court has not 
published an opinion either rejecting or accepting jurisdiction but 
based off of the precedent set in the fall of 2018, it would not seem 
too far off for the ICC to have willfully created a fourth avenue by 
which it could assert its own jurisdiction. 
This path, however, is not absent its own drawbacks. Even if 
the ICC were to accept jurisdiction, there exists a serious concern of 
both cooperation and enforceability. Take, for example, the ICC case 
against Sudanese President Omar Al Bashir. With an indictment and 
arrest warrants dating back to 2009, the president of Sudan has yet to 
be detained and the ICC has yet to proceed with a trial.114 Moreover, 
while Sudan is not a State party to the ICC, Al Bashir has made 
numerous visits to states that are party to the Rome Statute and who 
were ordered to hand over Al Bashir.115 Despite these outstanding 
warrants, state parties to the ICC, including Jordan, have refused to 
cooperate. Herein lies largely the flaw of the ICC: its exclusive reliance 
on state cooperation to function.116 The Rome Statute lacks any 
repercussions for state parties that fail to fulfill their obligations as a 
member; in fact, Article 87(7) of the Rome Statute specifically defers 
authority to the United Nations in situations of non-compliance by 
state parties.117 Even with a referral to the United Nations, 
repercussions remain unlikely. The UN charter allows suspension of a 
state following a recommendation by the Security Council, and 
subsequently, a state can be expelled if the state continues to violate its 
obligations upon a two thirds vote by the General Assembly and 
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absent any veto by the Security Council.118 As was the situation in the 
Al Bashir case, the ICC referred Jordan to the United Nations for 
failure to detain and surrender Al Bashir, but as of today, no formal 
actions have been taken to sanction or punish Jordan for failure to 
comply.119 Applying this fallibility to the case at hand, there remains a 
high chance that even with an indictment of senior officials of the 
Assad regime, prosecution would be halted at its early stages, 
particularly because the path of indictment being tried is through 
Jordan, a state that has already demonstrated a willingness to ignore its 
obligations to the ICC. Without collective state cooperation to detain 
and surrender those implicated in charges, ICC prosecution, even with 
appropriate jurisdiction, remains distant. 
C. Domestic Courts 
Even if the international community fails in its endeavors to 
pursue retributive justice, enthusiasm persists for justice to cascade, 
albeit, through the domestic court system. But this alternative 
maintains its own shortcomings, once again beating down hopes for 
Syrian justice and accountability through prosecution. While domestic 
courts would bring the process of accountability and retribution closer 
to the victims, a domesticized process without exhaustive reform 
would only polarize the country even further, leaving it susceptible to 
fall back into cyclical violence. The main concern with domestic 
prosecution would be the prevalence of judicial corruption. Given 
Syria, prior to the war, was not active in its exercise of due process of 
law and constitutionalism, it would be fair to assume that the state of 
the judiciary following the war would either be the same if not worse.120 
Add looming victor’s justice to the already rampant corruption and the 
result is a pseudo-court system with the Assad regime using the courts 
to target any and all members of the opposition. 
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It is also critical not to forget the size of the task that the 
domestic courts would have to undertake. Diving into nine plus years 
of war and a continually growing number of varying factions, both 
native and foreign, the courts would require a hefty source of funding 
to embark on such a project, from staff to investigative teams to even 
infrastructure like buildings and offices. Furthermore, because the 
prosecutions would be operating in a domestic setting, outside of 
international donors, the funding would most likely be sourced by the 
local population, namely the same victims requiring rehabilitation and 
justice. Ergo, Syrians would be diverting money away from local 
infrastructural and institutional reconstruction toward prosecution that 
focuses on the same individuals who caused the destruction in the first 
place. 
Nevertheless, even if the judiciary did conduct transformative 
internal reforms and even if there were sufficient resources available 
to funds the court’s escapades, there still remains the lingering 
sectarianism pulling at the country’s fabrics.121 An amalgam of varying 
religious, ethnic, and ideological circles, Syria’s modern political history 
has been shaped by a minority sect ruling over a disparate majority 
through systematic authoritarianism. To ignore this prevalent 
sectarianism when proceeding with domestic prosecution would only 
add insult to injury. Prosecution may produce an ephemeral tone of 
“justice” but may also lack any of the substantive societal implications 
such as local reconciliation and reconstruction. Domestic prosecution, 
without the efforts of an impartial international player, could 
exacerbate already fragile relationships. The pursuit of justice would in 
its entirety be halted if the country were to be plunged back into 
cyclical sectarian violence. 
IV. EVALUATING INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURTS 
Despite the above-mentioned challenges, global discourse 
predominately favors international prosecution as the solution to the 
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Syrian crisis.122 While optimism for justice is critical and owed to the 
Syrian people, it is equally as critical to spend time and resources 
efficiently, creating realistic frameworks for transitional justice that 
work for all the people of Syria. At the end of the day romanticized 
notions of punishment and accountability do little for the victims who 
are left without resources, without jobs, without infrastructure, and 
without human rights. Thus, even if an international criminal tribunal 
were able to come to fruition, it is imperative to understand the 
associated strings attached to such a mechanism—strings that could 
make prosecution an unattractive, injurious instrument as a vehicle for 
sham justice. Understanding the implications of a future tribunal 
means understanding the efficacy of past international tribunals. 
Measuring efficacy is not a simple task. Part of the problem lies 
in the fact that defining “success” for these international criminal 
courts remains contentious. One view of success could be whether the 
court has prosecuted as many international law violators as possible. 
Another view of success could be whether there has been an 
installation and maintenance of peace and democracy. With varying 
definitions for success comes varying views on the efficacy of these 
tribunals. There surely is no one correct way to evaluate efficacy. Thus, 
here we attempt to holistically evaluate past international criminal 
courts by looking at a number of considerations that might impact 
success: monetary cost, time, procurement of evidence, and legitimacy 
of the process. We conclude this evaluation by examining the influence 
of these past courts on the level of freedoms enjoyed within each 
targeted country. 
First, we start with cost. Trials are expensive and long. This is 
true whether you examine domestic or international trials. 
Investigations are lengthy, overhead costs for court in session are high, 
and sometimes the outcome is not always what the victim wants or 
needs. But take the already complex nature of domestic trials, throw in 
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different players from across the world, add in inaccessible evidence, 
and mix in a brand-new legal code for the proceedings; the result is an 
exponentially more convoluted, costly trial with a low conviction rate. 
This begs the question: at what point does the cost outweigh the value 
of these proceedings? 
When examining the history of the price of prosecution, the 
different types of international courts have to be taken into 
consideration to provide a holistic depiction of the range of costs that 
can be expected, from a small tribunal designed to address one specific 
event to a large tribunal designed to address years of armed conflict 
and violence. And while a holistic picture of the cost of tribunals can 
highlight key differences between the courts and the administration of 
the courts, it can also highlight key consistencies between them. The 
most obvious being the staggeringly high estimated total cost and the 
staggeringly low conviction rate. 
<Table 1> 
For instance, take the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (“STL”), a 
tribunal that’s been active for the past ten years following the terrorist 
attack on February 14, 2005, that killed former Lebanese Prime 
Minister Rafik Hariri and twenty-two others while injuring over 200 
individuals.123 The tribunal’s mandate is to address this precise attack, 
with conditional extended jurisdiction to address other terrorist crimes 
around this time period in Lebanon if the Court finds that these attacks 
were all interrelated.124 With a decade under its belt and half a billions 
dollars spent, all the STL has to show is nine indictments, four of 
which were indictments on charges of contempt for unauthorized 
release of confidential information related to ongoing STL cases.125 
Thus, only five indictments were on charges related to the February 
14th attack.126 Furthermore, one of the five accused died before the trial 
concluded, while the remaining four accused are fugitives with 
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outstanding warrants for their arrest.127 Half a billion dollars spent for 
no arrests, no convictions, and no clear indication of who was 
responsible for the attack. Additionally, the budget was funded 51% 
by voluntary contributions from member states in the UN and the 
remaining 49% by the people of Lebanon through taxes.128 This was 
already a high burden for a country that was on shaky economic 
grounds; but then, within the first two years of the establishment of 
the court, Lebanon began hosting its first wave of Syrian refugees, 
reaching more than 1.5 million refugees in 2014.129 By 2015, the 
unemployment rate in Lebanon had reached 20% and public debt had 
widened to 150% of the GDP.130 This version of justice has been 
defined by the victims themselves funding a court that is costly and 
inaccessible to the people. Rather than use that money to recoup the 
victims and their families following the attack, the country under 
international auspices proceeded down a path that has only devoured 
time and resources all the while allowing the alleged perpetrators to 
escape without a trace. The people of Lebanon bore the high cost of 
the tribunal without receiving any yield from the proceedings thus far. 
If this is the cost of justice, it is too high for justice not delivered, 
especially when Lebanon opted out of prosecuting individuals 
responsible for heinous violence that led to over 144,000 individuals 
being killed during the fifteen-year civil war (1975-1990).131 
On the other end of the spectrum, there are trials like the 
ICTY, designed to address years of violence and abuses, rather than a 
particular individual event. The ICTY, active for a little over two 
decades, was contrived to end a culture of impunity and to “help pave 
the way for reconciliation.”132 That “reconciliation” was funded by 
more than two billion dollars. The ICTY undeniably did indict more 
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than 150 individuals, more than half of which were convicted.133 But 
convictions alone are not sufficient to reconcile societies fractured by 
sectarianism. One survey found that the ICTY did little to transform 
relationships among the varying ethnic and religious communities in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, with most people reporting an unwillingness 
to forget and reconcile the crimes committed by other groups.134 Not 
only did the ICTY fail in rehabilitating these relationships, it actually 
aggravated them by reaffirming group identity. Finding the accused 
guilty solidifies narratives that criminalize the other side.135 
Accordingly, the more the ICTY was “successful” in its convictions, 
the stronger the enemy images would grow within each community. 
Those deteriorated inter-ethnic community networks were also further 
braced by the Dayton accords, which established a consociational 
government along ethnic lines.136 
A catch-22 thus evolves out of retributive justice. On the one 
hand, if the proceedings result in no convictions, an air of impunity 
survives with the high cost lingering as a reminder of the wasted 
resources. On the other hand, if the proceedings result in plentiful 
convictions, a silent consequence arises further fracturing of relations 
between the varying local groups that prompted the abuses in the first 
place. This leaves the country vulnerable to fall back into cycles of 
violence. With a history of international tribunals costing at least 
fourteen million dollars per indicted person, it is worth investigating 
why tribunals of these types cost so much and whether these funds 
would be better used elsewhere in the pursuit of transitional justice.137 
International tribunals incur similar expenses as domestic 
trials, with the exception being the cost of travel and the international 
nature of the tribunals complicating the costs incurred. For instance, 
domestic trials incur costs such as judge salaries, attorney salaries, 
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courtroom staff salaries, facility costs, and security cost.138 As the 
nature of the case grows more complicated, so do the associated costs. 
And the reasoning is evident: the more complicated a case, the longer 
the trial will be, thus the higher the costs.139 The same reasoning applies 
to international tribunals and their cases. The cases are riddled with 
such a high degree of complexity that the associated costs are 
significantly higher than we would see for an ordinary domestic trial. 
The complexity is spurred by a number of different factors. 
First, the accused are often charged with a higher number of 
offenses than domestic indictments, extending the length of the 
trials.140 Because of the degree of these crimes, the tribunals will hear 
more and longer witness testimonies. 141 Attorneys will use more time 
and resources to address these witness testimonies and the judges will 
take longer filtering admissible evidence. Furthermore, these witnesses 
often need to be flown into the country housing the tribunal. 
This relates to the second factor that complicates and increases 
the overall cost of tribunals: investigations. The investigative stage of 
international proceedings often takes longer because the evidence is 
harder to reach, a longer time period passes between the crime and the 
initiation of investigation, and international travel of varying 
investigators is required to retrieve such evidence. Additionally, the 
reliance on state cooperation leaves the court in a precarious position; 
in contrast to a domestic court where systems are already in place to 
do much of the pretrial legwork including arrests and evidence 
retrieval, international courts must staff their own groups to go into 
the relevant states to detain the accused, perform forensic 
investigations, and find witnesses to testify.142 
Third, the court is left using more resources and time to create 
codified procedural and substantive law to guide the trial.143 In a 
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domestic trial, the law is already laid out; practically no time is spent 
creating the law before the proceedings. In contrast, international 
tribunals lack codified precedent to go off of, thus novel issues arise 
related to the scope of the tribunal’s reach, admissibility questions, and 
to the elements in contention. Additionally, the cost of detention and 
sentences of the accused and guilty persons adds to the total bill, 
particularly if the accused are sentenced to lifetime in prison. 
International tribunals under the auspices of the UN prohibit the death 
penalty, thus the highest sentence possible is a lifetime imprisonment 
paid for either by the state itself or by other states that have yielded to 
house these convicted individuals.144 Put all these factors together and 
international prosecution becomes exponentially more intricate than 
any domestic proceeding. 
Another consideration in evaluating international criminal 
courts is the procurement of evidence. Due process of law survives in 
international adjudication; therefore, prosecutors bear the burden of 
proof, onus probandi, such that without substantive evidence, no accused 
may be found guilty.145 Implicitly, prosecutors are tasked with 
developing new investigative strategies to retrieve necessary but 
inaccessible evidence for the trials at hand. The origin of this authority 
lies in the peculiar disposition of the evidence required to determine 
the culpability of the accused on trial. Pair a need for evidence that is 
often inaccessible with that the absence of a singular codified set of 
rules detailing how prosecutors may obtain evidence, and the 
procurement of evidence grows to be one of the biggest obstacles 
encountered by international criminal courts. 
In contrast to national court systems, international criminal 
courts operate outside of state institutions that function hand in hand 
with the judiciary. Instead, international criminal courts establish their 
own mechanisms to replace those of the national institutions that a 
court would normally rely on for fact finding and evidence gathering. 
The authority to establish such mechanisms lies in Chapter VII of the 
UN Charter, with the exception of the ICC where it lies in the de jure 
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obligations created by the Rome Statute.146 The prosecutors are 
endowed with the responsibility to use this authority to retrieve 
evidence necessary to substantiate any claims made; but given that state 
consent is not always present, the prosecutors are obligated to 
maneuver their way through geopolitical hurdles to acquire whatever 
unknown evidence may exist. Take the ICTY for instance. The UN 
required all states to cooperate with the ICTY’s investigations; but, 
absent an enforcement mechanism and formal operations to instigate 
such investigations, the ICTY was left without a capacity to oblige 
states to comply with what was asked.147 Consequently, the Chief 
Prosecutors were charged with leading the investigation phase of the 
tribunals by expanding their military and political networks to increase 
their resources, expand their powers, and gain access to places and 
people they would otherwise be excluded from.148 As demonstrated, a 
dangerous interdependence emerges between the prosecutors and 
state officials. State officials get to decide what and whom prosecutors 
have access to, leaving room for victor’s justice to play a role in the 
procurement of evidence for indictments and trials. 
This leaves room to question the reliability and the justiciability 
of the evidence gathered by the prosecutors. While the prosecutors 
maintain the higher burden of proof, the defense still retains the right 
to rebut any prosecutorial claims by making assertions of their own. 
Yet without safeguard institutions in place to protect the balanced 
collection of evidence, the defense is only able to sift through evidence 
produced by the prosecution.149 In the case of the ICTR, defense 
counsel was not only blocked by the Rwandan government from 
interviewing potential witnesses, but they were also threatened and 
arrested for proceeding with investigations of their own.150 Despite an 
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appearance of due process, there exists an inequity in resources 
between the prosecution and the defense within international criminal 
courts, affording the prosecution more power under the law.151 
Procedural legitimacy of this process becomes even more 
dubious when the staffing of these courts is investigated. Because of 
previously mentioned resource and financial constraints, the staffing 
of these ad hoc courts can often include unqualified, ill-informed 
personnel. During the formation of the ICTY, such a heavy focus was 
placed on the Rules of Evidence and Procedure that the primarily 
international staff and management were largely neglected.152 As a 
result, integral players in the prosecutorial process, including attorneys, 
investigators, and judges, were left ignorant of relevant circumstances 
and viewpoints. This fostered insensitivity to the targeted ethnic 
populations, delegitimizing the process in the eyes of many of the 
victims. On the other end of the scale, staff sourced from local 
populations proved concerning for the ECCC as evidence arose that 
individuals were bribing Cambodian government officials for positions 
within the tribunal.153 There is legitimate skepticism in whether the 
process is designed to be fair. Not only are these courts reliant on the 
approval and funding by the permanent five members of the Security 
Council, but also, their inherent design is to go after a specified group 
of individuals. Thus, there exists little incentive to provide the 
defendants with adequate resources to prove their innocence. This was 
quite clear in the case of the SCSL, as the defense team received a very 
modest budget, making it one of the lowest ever allocated for legal aid 
for accused individuals.154 In addition, given the funding mechanism 
(i.e. donation based) of the majority of the tribunals, many defendants 
filed petitions against the SCSL claiming that donors compromise the 
independence of judges.155 When the budget is limited or gets cut, 
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those that pay the price are the defendants and victims.156 As long as 
an appearance of fairness survives, there is no higher authority that can 
combat inequality within the process. This draws doubt on the type of 
rule of law created by these systems. 
Moving beyond the due process deficit in the procurement of 
evidence by the prosecution and defense, we also find logistical 
challenges in just evaluating evidence once it has been retrieved. First, 
the mere volume of evidence that the parties and the arbitrator must 
decipher proves time consuming.157 Witness testimony, both written 
affidavits and oral statements, has evolved to become a prominent 
player in these trials.158 Thus, prosecutors and defense attorneys are 
required to sift through interviews and statements to evaluate the 
reliability and the admissibility of this evidence. Without a set of rules 
to guide admissibility, this process is similar to navigating through the 
dark. 
Second, language complicates percolating through the 
evidence.159 Given the international nature of the court, translations 
are required for every step of the process, with attorneys, judges, and 
witnesses varying in the use of primary languages.160 But more than just 
translating documents and witness statements, all parties involved have 
to be hyper-aware of the impact of language on decisions and on the 
arbiter of fact. 
Third, the free rein on admissible evidence entails longer trials, 
more evidence to consider, and stronger discretion by the judges to 
either give evidence different weights or to exclude the evidence all 
together.161 Both the ICTY and the ICTR shared the same rule on 
evidence: “A Chamber may admit any relevant evidence which it 
deems to have probative value.”162 Thus, practically no evidence is ever 
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excluded during these proceedings, despite doubts of credibility and 
chances of prejudice. With the inclusion of all evidence, the 
prosecutors and the defense have to rely more on the judges to trust 
that they will give the evidence the weight it deserves, rather than rely 
on safeguards to preclude unnecessarily pernicious evidence.163 This 
judicial empowerment can raise concerns, especially when cases of 
judicial impropriety arise, such as the case of the ECCC.164 
If such a costly mechanism is to be used, there needs to be, at 
the minimum, an assurance that the apparatus produces intended 
consequences—that retributive justice will achieve the goals it was 
designed to accomplish. If such an endeavor is to be undertaken, the 
product that the international community is buying into should 
certainly meet expectations. Both UN resolutions that established the 
international tribunals for Yugoslavia (UNSCR 827) and Rwanda 
(UNSCR 955) maintained that the tribunals would contribute to the 
process of reconciliation and “the restoration and maintenance of 
peace.”165 Within the international community, there exists an 
underlying belief that trials will: (1) improve human rights protections 
and diminish repression,166 (2) have a deterrent effect,167 (3) contribute 
to the development of liberal democracy,168 and (4) guide the reform 
of the national criminal justice system as well as promote the rule of 
law.169 
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However, while advocates of tribunals argue that retributive 
justice is the most pertinent, and for some the only, response to 
addressing human rights and humanitarian law violations, several 
scholars have cautioned against such an approach, even questioning 
the relationship between trials and post-conflict peacebuilding. For 
instance, Lie, Binningsbo and Gates find that trials have a weak and 
inconsistent effect on the durability of peace.170 On the other hand, 
Meernick, Nichols and King171 as well as Olsen, Payne and Reiter172 
conclude that countries that experience only trials are no more or less 
likely to experience recurrence of violence or witness improvements in 
human rights practices and democracy than countries that do not have 
any prosecutions. 
<Table 2> 
Given the mixed empirical findings in the literature on the 
relationship between countries that have prosecutions and those that 
have not, we turn to take a look at how the tribunals mentioned in 
Table 1 have affected each of the states that were involved. 
Investigating the efficacy of tribunals through paradigmatic goals of 
liberal democracy and individual values, it would be expected that an 
effective mechanism would demonstrate consistent success. Table 2, 
outlining freedom levels of countries post-tribunal, casts international 
prosecution in a bleaker light than the narrative that primarily 
dominates the field of transitional justice.173 It is evident that even after 
twenty-six years following the establishment of the ICTY, the states 
that make up former Yugoslavia have varied from being free (Croatia, 
Serbia and Slovenia) to partly free (Bosnia & Herzegovina, Macedonia, 
and Montenegro). As for Rwanda, the country is still considered not 
free with severe threats on political and civil liberties, despite 
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guarantees in the constitution. Pair Cambodia’s freedom level (not 
free) with its estimated total cost ($300 million) and it becomes unclear 
if the investment in such an apparatus is producing any beneficial 
outcome, particularly for the victims of the armed conflict. 
<Table 3> 
Proponents of retributive justice further maintain that 
tribunals offer justice and accountability, but just as importantly they 
normalize the rule of law. However, if we take a look at the impact of 
the ICTY on each of the states that emerged from the dissolution of 
Yugoslavia we, again, find mixed results in terms of the level of the 
rule of the law in each of the countries (see Table 3).174 Despite the 
same ad hoc institution pursuing aims of accountability and justice, the 
effects vary across the board. On one end, Slovenia has benefitted with 
a rule of law score at 14/16. On the other end, however, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina suffer weak rule of law (score of 7/16) with a fragmented 
judiciary, inconsistent guarantees of due process of law, and rampant 
discrimination both within and by state institutions.175 One of the main 
reasons we see such a difference in the scores for the rule of law is due 
to the variation in the level of independence of the judiciary, guarantees 
of due process, corruption and patronage within the justice system as 
well as discrimination against ethnic and religious minorities across the 
different states that emerged. Despite an estimated total cost of $2.3 
billion, the emerging states of the former Yugoslavia experienced 
disparate impacts following prosecution, with some benefiting and 
some remaining predisposed to injustice. As such, funding such an 
institution might prove to be an unproductive endeavor considering 
the absence in consistency of success. 
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V. ALTERNATIVES TO RETRIBUTIVE JUSTICE 
One of the main issues that arises with retributive forms of 
transitional justice is that retribution ignores the nexus between state 
fragility, socio-economic inequity, and self-perpetuating cycles of 
violence. Imbalances in social capital paired with highly fallible 
institutions fosters an environment hospitable to communal violence. 
Irrespective of the number of perpetrators indicted and convicted, if a 
country transitioning out of war is unable to transform away from its 
previous condition, it is left vulnerable to the divisive issues that led to 
the armed conflict in the first place. Looking past retributive justice, 
we find restorative justice, aimed at reconstruction, reparations, and 
reconciliation, not just at an institutional level, but more importantly, 
at grassroots, interpersonal level. 
A. Reconstruction 
Reconstruction can and should occur in three distinct 
dimensions: (1) political, (2) security, and (3) economic. Syria’s current 
environment, even before the end of armed conflict, is ripe to receive 
new practices, policies, and pillars to create a new state foundation, 
both on a national level and on a local level. Particular to 
reconstruction would be the redistribution and balance of social capital 
among the varying ethno-religious and political sects throughout Syria, 
with a specific focus on transforming and rehabilitating the 
relationships of the different groups that comprise the Syrian 
population. While the reconstruction of the three dimensions is going 
to look quite different among them, it should remain that they are 
consistent in integrating power-sharing arrangements to breed security 
and stability.176 Power sharing arrangements ensure that all groups are 
afforded protections and equity in their share of state power and social 
capital, preventing one group from overpowering another.177 
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Political reconstruction, with power sharing arrangements in 
mind, needs to accommodate the diverse ethnic, religious, and political 
makeup of Syria. Especially considering the sectarian nature of the war, 
any political arrangement moving forward must be encompassing of 
the different cleavages in a manner that balances the shares of 
authority. Khoury and Ghosn suggest integrative consociationalism as 
the political power sharing arrangement for Syria.178 This system fuses 
traditional consociationalism, guaranteeing proportional 
representation for the varying cleavages, with an integrative system, 
that moves towards a more centralized national identity.179 Here, the 
hybrid system would envelop and protect the ethno-cultural cleavages 
under one umbrella of unified national identity. 
This begs the question: should the country proceed with a 
campaign of lustration, universal amnesty, or meet somewhere in the 
middle? Considering all sides of the war are guilty of war crimes, a 
purge of officials loyal to the former regime would be contrary to 
national reconstruction efforts by signifying that supporters of the 
former regime are disparately being punished more than the other sides 
of the war. Additionally, an exhaustive purge of government officials 
could create a personnel dilemma by disqualifying a large portion of 
technocrats that might be essential to administrative and specialized 
roles within the government.180 On the other hand, universal amnesty 
could preclude bureaucratic reform by diminishing the integrity of 
power sharing and accountability within the new regime. The 
equilibrium to this dilemma would be fusing a comprehensive vetting 
system while excising the individuals that present the greatest 
detriment to reform. It is critical though that those individuals that are 
removed from civil service are provided with economic security, by 
means of pensions and severance packages, to ensure they do not fall 
vulnerable to unemployment and the same economic grievances that 
drove the country to conflict in the first place.181 
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Establishing a legitimate monopoly over the use of force is 
necessary in safeguarding against the machine of civil violence. 
Normative security sector reform (“SSR”) addresses institutional 
security deficits through a state-centric lens.182 Primarily, SSR leads 
with the demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration of factional 
forces.183 This provides that the new security apparatus co-opts 
militant groups who took to arms during the war. If the new military 
is unable to co-opt certain groups, the new security apparatus must 
ensure it can curb the influence of such armed groups as to weaken 
any spoiler effect they may have on the new fledgling institution and 
civil peace. While this unquestionably addresses certain sectarian 
issues, there additionally needs to be an underlying redevelopment of 
trust between state institutions and civil society.184 This can be 
spearheaded by efforts to reorganize security sector mechanisms 
around a normative legal framework that stresses transparency, 
accountability, and the protection of liberties, particularly for any 
minorities. Furthermore, similar to political reconstruction, a system 
of vetting should be utilized to ensure administrative technocrats 
within the security apparatus can remain, while those that pose the 
largest detriments to the integrity of the institution are removed, 
creating room for more participation by the historically marginalized 
populations. 
The length of the conflict in Syria, eight years of economic 
infrastructural destruction, combined with the economic grievances 
that existed prior to the conflict has bred conditions that make 
economic reconstruction a necessity, rather than a suggestion. Any 
reconstruction that does not transform the economic status quo would 
be reconstruction that is ignorant of the economic component to civil 
violence. Power sharing arrangements within the economic domain 
would address structural inequities that engender inter-group 
resentment and violence. Additionally, only when a country is 
financially stable can it begin to realistically examine retributive justice 
mechanisms to combat impunity and build a culture of accountability. 
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For instance, Olsen, Payne, and Reiter found that high- and middle-
income countries were more likely to utilize trials for justice, while low 
income countries were more likely to use amnesty for justice.185 Thus, 
to even begin a realistic discussion of punishment and deterrence, 
economic reconstruction has to be prioritized. Khoury and Ghosn 
suggest an adoption scheme, as was used in Lebanon, to help fund 
bottom-up efforts at economic revitalization.186 In this way, non-
governmental organizations (“NGOs”), international governmental 
organizations (“IGOs”), other states can directly fund and compensate 
grassroots projects aimed at the rebuilding of infrastructure and 
homes, social and psychological rehabilitation of civil society, and 
creating a balance of access to economic welfare for all cleavages, 
ensuring no one group monopolizes these resources.187 This scheme 
ensures enough financial flexibility to allow a manifold of programs to 
be established that tailor to the needs of particular regions, while 
simultaneously providing room for the government to undertake 
internal reconstruction measures without the weight of an unilateral 
national economic transformation. 
B. Reparations 
Reparations can work as a compliment rather than a stand-
alone mechanism to economic reconstruction and the broader aims of 
transitional justice. Reparations, as a vehicle for restorative justice, 
explicitly address the damages and injuries to victims and families of 
victims. The need for such an apparatus has even been addressed by 
the UN, which has created a framework for post-armed conflict states 
to work with to address victim needs following mass violations of 
international human rights law and international humanitarian law.188 
Reparations pairs with reconstruction in that victim recognition is 
emphasized simultaneously with state reform, ensuring that trust and 
social parity is enshrined in the transitional process. It is critical, 
however, that reparations are not approached with a traditional lens 
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that is molded around domestic forms of damages for civil injuries. 
Such mechanisms rely solely on state instituted reparation programs 
comprising only of material compensation to restore victims back to 
their original state prior to the injury. This vehicle is unrealistic for 
Syria considering both the sheer number of victims to be repaired and 
the financial incapacity and relative weakness of the state. Thus, 
programs for reparations, akin to the economic reconstruction 
discussed above, should expand beyond state administered programs 
to include third parties such as other states and NGOs, as well as 
diversify its capital of reparations to include both material and 
symbolic redress across a spectrum targeting individuals and 
communities.189 
As was recommended for economic reconstruction, an adoption 
scheme can provide the financial means to pursue programs of redress 
by expanding the pool of sources from which compensation and 
projects can be drawn. For instance, following the 2006 war in 
Lebanon, Qatar took lead in bypassing the Lebanese government to 
directly compensate victims in some of the most damaged parts of the 
country, including Aynata, Beint Jbeil, and Khiam.190 Victims would 
submit claims to the local Qatari office, which upon review, would 
issue checks directly back to the victims.191 Such forms of 
compensation can address housing damages, loss of income, and 
treatment for physical and mental health. Beyond such individualized 
material compensation, the adoption scheme can be also used to establish 
community programs, including educational grants and health 
services.192 Reparations can thus induce the early stages of socio-
economic justice while concurrently working with reconstruction 
projects to provide the needed state infrastructure to not only maintain 
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such progress but to also bridge grassroots efforts with broader, 
national efforts. 
C. Reconciliation 
A consistent theme throughout non-retributive justice is the 
transformation of relationships throughout society. Without targeting 
the crux of the social breakdown that allowed such violence and 
dehumanization to occur, groups are going to maintain their narrative 
that perpetuates an “us” vs. “them” dimension. Scholars warn of the 
impact of enemy images- the perpetual cycle that moves from hostile 
images to violence back to a self-reinforcing hostile image of the 
“other” by providing evidence of the “other’s” ill intentions.193 To halt 
such cycles, the relationships and the images have to be reimagined. 
Integral to reimagining relationships for the future is understanding the 
relationships of the past. 
A truth and reconciliation commission should be established, 
to provide an exhaustive history of all the abuses and human rights 
violations committed by all actors in the war for all communities 
throughout Syria. In contrast to trials where individual criminal liability 
is emphasized, truth commissions aim to create a single narrative that 
encompasses all of the crimes committed by all party sides to the 
armed conflict. This compiled narrative thus creates a new collective 
identity.194 With such a comprehensive documented history, areas 
within state institutions that require the most reform can be uncovered, 
necessary reparations to certain victimized communities can be 
outlined, and projects can be undertaken to begin social and 
psychological healing at the most grassroots level possible. 
Furthermore, similar to the Independent International Commission of 
Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic and the International Impartial 
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and Independent Mechanism, the documentation of such abuses can 
be stored for later prosecutorial use. 
Local control over reconciliation, which has already emerged 
even in the midst of continuing armed conflict, is pivotal in allowing 
for a peacebuilding process that is individualized and sensitive to the 
particular regions and communities it is affecting. Moreover, it allows 
for a grassroots level of accountability and transparency within the 
rebuilding process, safeguarding that the products of such endeavors 
are sustainable. For instance, in Al -Waar, a town in the Homs 
governorate that witnessed a large amount of sectarian violence, the 
local council took part in a series of negotiations over the course of a 
year with both the Regime, rebels, and Russian forces.195 Despite many 
obstacles to negotiations, the council was able to ensure a halt to 
hostilities, access to humanitarian assistance, prisoner exchanges, and 
general disarmament.196 Because of the work by the local council, 
residents reported improved living conditions, including increased 
access to basic goods, increased freedom of movement, and an 
increased feeling of safety.197 In addition to local governance, initiatives 
for reconciliation have been spearheaded by community leaders, 
women’s groups, youth initiatives, religious leaders, and various other 
civil society organizations.198 In some cases, these groups have 
approached reconciliation through a teaching lens, convening 
workshops and open forums to discuss conflict resolution, violence 
prevention, battling sectarian rhetoric, and coexistence.199 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
When assessing Syria’s future in terms of transitional justice, it 
can be easy to get caught in a maelstrom of romanticized, neoliberal 
views on justice: punishing the guilty, while avenging the victims. Syria 
has certainly proven to be one of the worst atrocities in contemporary 
history, with media and mass communication bringing the destruction 
of the war to our living rooms half a world away. At no point should 
it be doubted that those that have committed the worst of crimes need 
to be held accountable; they need to pay the price for crimes they have 
committed and the lives they have taken. But by the same token, the 
people of Syria, those whom were devastated by the war, those whose 
livelihoods have been swept away, those that remain to find their 
county broken, deserve to have realistic and effective mechanisms in 
place to transition their country away from armed conflict into a new 
period of restoration. In the case of Sierra Leone, the running joke was 
that every single detainee at the Special Council had gained weight 
during incarceration due to the quality of food, while detainees at 
regular courts were packed in prison cells like meat freezers200 and 
amputee victims were begging on the streets for food.201 Similarly, 
victims in the Ugandan conflict noted how Dominic Ongwen, who 
was on trial for seventy counts of war crimes and crimes against 
humanity, had better living conditions and entitlements than his 
victims back in Uganda who had not received any form of support to 
heal or recover.202 
Furthermore, the global climate surrounding these 
international criminal courts, that ostensibly aim to deliver justice, is 
overwrought, not only in claims of impotence, but also in doubts of 
legitimacy. Take, for example, the United States’ refusal to allow ICC 
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prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda, into the country to investigate potential 
war crimes violations by the U.S. in Afghanistan.203 As one of the five 
permanent members of the Security Council, the U.S.’ defiance to 
comply with the ICC is behavior that engenders further disregard of 
these allegedly “permanent” international institutions. If one of world’s 
global powers is inclined to ignore strides at retributive justice, there 
leaves little incentive for smaller, transitioning countries to act any 
differently. 
Institutions are at play that hinder the establishment of such 
international prosecution, particularly if the Assad regime is to stay in 
power and Russia is to continue shielding the regime. Both ad hoc 
tribunals and the ICC would require approval from the Security 
Council, which is currently unattainable with Russia’s occupancy of 
one of the five permanent seats. Similarly, domestic courts 
demonstrate an inability to deliver justice with their current 
dependency on the Assad regime. Unless the judiciary was to undergo 
an exhaustive purge and reformation, domestic courts would only 
continue in the path of systematic injustice. 
Even if Syria was able to find a path to international 
prosecution, the cost and challenges of pursuing such a mechanism do 
not appear to equal the value received by the victims. The complexity 
of such lengthy trials implies notoriously high costs, especially when 
the cost is evaluated against the number of people indicted by these 
tribunals. From the ECCC costing 300 million dollars to the ICC 
costing a billion dollars, international prosecution proves to be a 
financial feat with a deep need for a steady stream of resources. Given 
that President Trump has been cutting back on American funding of 
the UN and other international institutions, it will be quite difficult for 
any new tribunal to get the requisite financial support to be effective.204 
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Additionally, international prosecution also faces challenges in 
its pursuit of evidence, the bread and butter of all prosecutions. From 
political obstacles to the mere logistics of sorting through the volumes 
of evidence, trials struggle to find appropriate means of proving 
allegations, especially without the guidance of a codified rule book to 
screen admissible and non- admissible evidence. Furthermore, the 
procurement of evidence proves especially challenging given the 
serious nature of the crimes and the destruction caused by armed 
conflict. 
Thus, instead of allocating resources and hope to an institution 
that has failed to deliver justice and successful deterrence, alternate 
means of transitional justice should be explored. The same amount of 
money that has been spent on tribunals could be diverted to 
reconstruction efforts (political, economic, and military) and 
reparations that focus on rebuilding from a grassroots level. This could 
take the shape of new schools, memorializing the lives lost, rebuilding 
fractured industries, investing in new and burgeoning local markets, or 
even rebuilding broken roads and buildings. Resources could also be 
redirected towards reconciliation initiatives that aim to rebuild and 
transform relationships throughout social groups. 
There are a number of alternatives for transitional justice other 
than retributive justice. For the people of Syria, post armed conflict 
mechanisms need to be explored in a manner that works to benefit 
them, rather than alienate them. Justice should be investing in the 
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Table 2: Freedom Level in 2018 
 
 Freedom Level 
ICTY  
Bosnia & Herzegovina Partly Free 
Croatia Free 
Macedonia Partly Free 




Rwanda Not Free 
ECCC  
Cambodia Not Free 
SCSL  
Sierra Leone Partly Free 
STL  




Table 3: Rule of Law in Former Yugoslavian States 
 
 Rule of Law 
Bosnia & Herzegovina 7/16 
 
Croatia 11/16 
 
Macedonia 8/16 
 
Montenegro 10/16 
 
Serbia 9/16 
 
 
 
